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Andrew Clark 
F aIling through the 
Cracks: Queer Theory, 
Same-Sex Marriage, 
Lawrence v Texas, and 
Liminal Bodies 
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On November 4, 2008, 
voters in California voted on 
Proposition 8 and successfully 
overturned state-recognized 
same-sex marriage. Before the 
vote on November 4, both sides 
of the argument were concerned 
with how marriage might be 
redefined, and what the 
continuation or the end of same-
sex marriage would mean for 
California, married couples (both 
gay and straight), and the 
institution of marriage itself. 
The vote on Proposition 8 
is just one in a long line of legal 
battles that define and refine 
same-sex relationships. Since the 
Baehr v. Lewin decision in 
Hawaii in 1993 and the passage of 
DOMA in 1996, gay relationships, 
and more specifically gay 
marriage, have been at the fore of 
political social thought. Looking 
at the literature available on 
same-sex relationships vis-a-vis 
politics and the law, Lawrence v. 
Texas is a major defining legal 
decision and is often the focus of 
law scholars, academic writers, 
and queer theorists. Queer 
theorists and the contemporary 
gay rights movement both use 
Lawrence to support their claims 
about the institution of marriage 
and its value to the queer 
community. Queer readings of 
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marriage question the regulatory and demarcating effects of state 
sanctioned relationships, citing Lawrence as evidence of the state further 
defining acceptable queer relationships.l As Nan Hunter explains, the 
government will ironically be more (not less) involved in the examination 
and propagation of properly queer relationships.2 National gay rights 
organizations cite Lawrence as a step in the direction of full equality. 
Lawrence v. Texas decriminalized sodomy, thereby protecting same-sex 
sex acts in the private sphere. For many national gay organizations, with 
the achievement of privacy protection in hand, the next step is public 
recognition of gay relationships and their value to society. 
Both sides of the gay marriage debate miss two key elements in 
their arguments. First, both frame same-sex marriage in an either/or 
dichotomy. Either there is gay marriage, or there is traditional marriage. 
While both sides are willing to examine the effects of marriage for either 
gay or straight couples, neither side really looks at those liminal 
relationships and bodies that occupy the liminal space produced by state-
recognized marriage, regardless of configuration. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg 
defines liminal bodies as those that occupy "the state of being between 
categories and the power inherent in that process."3 Liminal bodies do not 
neatly fall into a single category, but rather have the ability to slip in and 
out of categorical spaces. This slippage allows liminal bodies to use the 
current system to their advantage while simultaneously exposing the 
cracks in that system through their occupation of liminal political and 
cultural space. 
Secondly, neither side examines how the institution of marriage is 
both positively and negatively productive of bodies. Jasbir Puar argues 
that Lawrence reflects the nationalist, regulatory, and racialized rhetoric 
of Post-9/n politics,4 while Amy Brandzel highlights the function of 
racialized citizenship in same-sex marriage.5 Lawrence and the current 
debate on same-sex marriage function within cultural and political 
rhetoric that serves to delimit further who can access state-recognized 
marriage and the benefits that come with it, read by Brandzel as full 
citizenship.6 The refinement of what marriage means broadens the gap of 
accessing marriage for bodies that do not fit within current nationalist 
politics and who are not properly raced or middle or upper class. The 
effects of marriage as an institution coupled with post-9/n politics further 
produces liminal and racialized bodies that are increasingly 'other' in that 
they are non-white, of the poor and working classes, and definitely not 
part of the national fabric of the US. 
While both queer theory and the current gay rights movement 
examine what same-sex marriage means/will mean for the LGBT 
community, it is important to examine what liminal bodies can tell us 
about marriage and the current political landscape of surveillance and 
racialization. Looking at the current literature, I examine how both queer 
theorists and the contemporary gay rights movement have situated the 
current debate surrounding gay relationships and same-sex marriage. This 
examination highlights a gap in the research that can be filled by looking 
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at how liminal bodies function within the marriage debates in a post-9/ll 
political setting. This kind of examination frees the debate of the either/or 
dich~tomy while providing a more nuanced reading of the current 
marnage debate. And while the social positioning of liminal bodies is 
marginalized, ~e embrace of that position and the ways in which people 
ch~ose to naVIgate ~e regulatory system through differing modes of 
resIstance could proVIde those bodies/relationships, which seemingly have 
no future, with a liberatory destiny that bridges the gap of queer theory 
and the mainstream gay and lesbian culture. 
In what follows, I trace the historical past of the gay liberation 
movement up to the 2003 Lawrence decision and the critiques of the case. 
While the decriminalization of sodomy laws should be celebrated, we 
should pay attention to the decision's phraseology and the function of the 
d~c~sion as a regulation and surveillance tool of the state. I expand this 
cnt.tque of Lawre!1ce by placing it in the context of a post-9/ll regulatory 
regime that functions not only to marginalize bodies on the basis of race 
class, and nationality, but that is also productive of both deviant and 
l~~nal bo~es ~nd relationships. In the final section, I use the concept of 
hmmal bodIes In the hopes of blending both the queer critique and the 
push for same-sex marriage. This particular queer reading of politics 
ackn?w.le.dges the. queer past and looks to the future, embracing a 
multiphcIty of family structures that includes marriage, while questioning 
the role of the state in regulating bodies via sexuality. 
RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN: QUEERING (OR STRAIGHTENING) 
THE NATIONAL BODY 
.The events of September 11, 2001 set in motion nationalistic 
rhetonc that was not only overtly racist, but which also had sexual 
u~d~rtones (and perhaps overtones), within which Lawrence plays a 
dIstinct chord. Puar believes that , 
Considering the contemporaneous consolidation of 
~ew . ra~ial populations, a racialization of religion, 
Imphcating Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians and 
~hose mistaken for them ("terrorist look-alikes"), the 
Impact of Lawrence-Garner must be examined in this 
inten~~ly charged racial atmosphere, which 
repetitively defines the slippery contours of racial 
markings not only in relation to a dominant white 
American formation, but also among people of color 
themselves.7 
Wor~ng from he~ theory ofyS sexual exceptionalism- one that sets up 
~encans as haVIng a supenor (read restrained) sexuality in comparison 
With the undoubtedly Muslim terrorist 'other'-she argues that Lawrence 
allows the US to accept a domesticated type of homosexuality that paints 
27 
Clark 
the US as sexually diverse, while simultaneously creating space for the 
homophobic rhetorical description of terrorist sexuality as unrestrained 
and always already verging on the psychotic. According to Puar, the 
decision presented in Lawrence and the current push for same-sex 
marriage work in collusion with nationalist anti-Muslim rhetoric that 
maintains the sexual superiority of the US while appearing legalistically 
free of race. 
Puar not only mentions those bodies/relationships/races/religions 
that are scrutinized and ostracized by national sexual exceptionalism 
presented in Lawrence, but actually analyzes the effects of the decision in 
concert with the current political, national and global landscape, noting 
that it is both regulatory and productive of bodies.8 Moreover, she 
critiques the ascendency of whiteness that other critics of Lawrence leave 
unexamined. Puar looks at bodies that occupy a space of crossing, whether 
it be of race, gender, sex, sexuality, nationality, religion or geography. Her 
examination of bodies of crossing produces a more nuanced reading of the 
racial and class effects of Lawrence and the desire for same-sex marriage, 
while not forgetting the other already domestic bodies of crossing. 
Applying a lens that considers both race/ethnicity and class to Lawrence 
and the current debate surrounding same-sex marriage removes the 
argument from an either/or framework without committing the modernist 
move of returning to an idealized and romanticized notion of queer 
politics. 
In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman 
examines queerness and its rejection in terms of a nationalistic claim on 
the future. Edelman argues that, because homosexuals and queers have 
been painted as a disease unto death that has no (re)productive future, 
queers should embrace the identity they have been given in an effort to 
end the ceaseless and repetitious claims on futurity by the heterosexist 
nation-state. For Edelman, it is the notion of the future that is a regulatory 
practice, one that calls bodies to heterosexuality and monogamy while 
serving to render queer bodies as anti-nationalist. Edelman believes that 
we are compelled to heterosexuality because we as a nation place so much 
emphasis on the future and the reproduction of our people and culture. 
While Edelman's work seems unrelated to the issue at hand, one 
could say that the nation-state's wish to claim reproductive futurity ended 
with the Lawrence decision. Albeit limited, Lawrence indicates that the 
state is willing to recognize same-sex relations, although the extent to 
which those relationships are recognized and the effects of that recognition 
are subject to debate. On the other hand, one could read Lawrence and the 
push for same-sex marriage as a way in which to incorporate gays and 
lesbians into the regulatory and endlessly repetitious notion of the future. 
Marriage is bound up with institutions that prefigure a future: property 
rights, rights of inheritance, children and their rights. Allowing same-sex 
couples to marry would grant them access to a state-propagated future. It 
is this latter reading of Edelman that, in conjunction with Puar, highlights 
how Lawrence functions within a regulatory nation-state whose politics 
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create properly nationalist and deviant bodies. Further, the political 
lan~scape in which Lawrence and same-sex marriage function produces 
bodies that are not clearly defined, that can slip in and out of categories. 
QUEER VESTIGES: LOOKING BACK IN TIME 
Gay politics today is one of domestication. Everywhere one looks, 
gays and lesbians are seemingly visible in the media and on the street. 
Depending on location, it is not uncommon to see two men holding hands 
or kissing, or to hear of a union ceremony between two people of the same 
sex. Gay characters are present on nearly every primetime television 
network: Desperate Housewives, Ugly Betty, Will & Grace, Family Guy, 
South Park, and Grey's Anatomy. The list goes on and on. Showtime 
Networks has even more gay and lesbian exposure with the recently ended 
Queer as Folk and The L Word, and has continued with Nurse Jackie. 
Although 0e presentation of gay and lesbian (and sometimes bi or trans) 
characters IS a welcome addition to television dramas, gay and lesbian 
characters are invariably relegated to either a stereotypical performance of 
gayness, or are nicely domesticated and rarely deviate from the norms and 
lives of their straight counterparts. 
The domestication we see of gay narratives reflected in the media is 
part and parcel of a much larger project of domestication and nationalism. 
In order for a group to be domesticated, the state must define it as a 
cate~ory through state institutions of power. Institutions serve to regulate 
bodies and groups through the production and maintenance hierarchical 
social positioning. Numerous historians have examined how the 
"homosexual" as an identity category came into being,9 most starting with 
Foucault, who stated, 
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes 
sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; thei; 
perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical 
subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual 
became a personage, a past, a case history and a 
childhood, in addition to being a type of lif~, a life 
form, and a morphology ... Nothing that went into his 
total composition was unaffected by his 
sexualit;Y ... The sodomite had been a temporary 
aberratIOn; the homosexual was now a species. 10 
~ou~a~t highl~ghts ~ocial, medical, religious, and psychological 
ms~tuti~ns a~d IdeolOgIes that, by ~orking together, produce categories of 
bodI~s-m thIS exa~ple the deVIant body- while also simultaneously 
defin~ng normal bodIes. The production of categories allows institutions to 
exerCIse P?wer. 0.ver bodies by making bodies easily manageable and 
cul~ally mtelhgIble, as well as by compelling subjects to bend their 
bodIes and bodily experience into a defined category. 
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Lawrence v. Texas exemplifies both the function of power to render 
bodies and subjects as intelligible and how bodies and subjects are 
compelled to fit within existing categories. First and foremost, the notion 
that same-sex acts- defined as sodomy in Lawrence-should be legal does 
not necessarily constitute a category of (gay) people called into legal being. 
But it does show the desire to have certain sexual acts between two 
consenting adults recognized as legal under the Constitution. Further, the 
language of the decision provides room for same-sex sex acts in private 
and is further supported, as we will see in Katherine Franke's reading of 
the decision, by a language that alludes to same-sex sex acts occurring in 
the form of a couple. II The desire for legality of same-sex sex acts and the 
language of the decision alludes to gays and lesbians being compelled by 
the state to seek a state-authorized relationship, just like that of straight 
people. 
Secondly, Lawrence and the current push for same-sex marriage 
show just how the state functions to further define and refine social 
categories of bodies. The queer and legal literature presented here 
expresses anxiety about Lawrence because of its defining characteristics, 
which arguably and ironically give the state more control over same-sex 
relationships. What started with Lawrence and continues with gay 
marriage is the state creating, defining, and controlling same-sex 
relationships. The definition of same-sex relations, closely demarcated by 
the state, serves to regulate what bodies qualify for marriage, and thereby 
some bodies and relationships have either very limited access or no access 
to the state-propagated relationship. 
While parts of the gay and lesbian movement celebrated Lawrence 
as a landmark case for civil rights, the queer faction decried the decision 
and was left wondering how marriage-an institution heavily critiqued 
during gay liberation-suddenly became the focus of most of the national 
gay and lesbian organizations. Many queer activists and academics 
believed that the sudden push for same-sex marriage was indicative of a 
sort of cultural amnesia that left the projects of gay liberation behind.12 
Further, many queer activists and academics view the Lawrence decision 
and the push for same-sex marriage as further state intrusion into 
personal relationships and increased regulation of sex and sexuality. 
HISTORY OF QUEER MOVEMENT 
The 1950S and 1960s homophile movement experienced many of 
the same issues that the current gay and lesbian civil rights movement is 
experiencing. The question of how gay people fit into the fabric of the 
American public plagued the homophile movement, causing serious 
f(r)actioning among the movement's leaders and of the gay and lesbian 
community. Some- like the Daughters of Bilitis and the later incarnation 
of the Mattachine society led by Ken Burns-wished to operate on terms of 
"respectability" in an effort to show straights that gays were no different, 
except in their choice of partner. Others wished to take a separatist 
30 
Falling through the Cracks 
ap~roach, pOi?ting out that gays and lesbians were not at all like straight 
society and did. not wish to be assimilated into an already white, middle 
class, heteroseXlst and heteronormative culture. 
~eeing a g:owing movement on the rise in 1969, Carl Wittman 
wro~e his gay manl~esto. ~e examines and disavows many of the tenants of 
straight s?~lety while call1~g. out those who wish to seek a politics of gay 
re~pectabih~ .through ImJ~ucry of straight society. Quite specifically, 
WIttman cnticIzes gay marnage: 
:rra?iti~nal marriage is a rotten, oppressive 
mstitution. Those of us who have been in heterosexual 
marriages too often have blamed our gayness on the 
bre~up o~ the marriage. No. They broke up because 
mamage IS a contract which smothers people ... Gay 
people must stop gauging their self respect by how 
well they mimic straight marriages. Gay marriage will 
have the same problems as straight ones except in 
bu~lesque. For. the usual legitimacy and pressure 
whic~ keep straIght marriages together are absent, 
e.g. kids, what parents think, what neighbors say.13 
Wi~an ~ls on gays and lesbians to stop comparing their lifestyle and 
relationships to those of heterosexual people. Rather, Wittman would 
prefer to see the gay and lesbian community form its own set of ideas 
produced from .the questioning and critique of straight society. ' 
E,:en With .such a radical approach to politics, identity, and 
commuIl:Ity form~tion.a~ ~ut fo.rth by Wittman in 1969, larger and deeper 
ass~mptions ar~ Imph~It m WIttman's critique of straight society. While 
calhng .out straIg?t SOCIety for the propagation of heteronormativity and 
what IS es~entially a broken system, neither Wittman nor his 
~ontemp"ora~es w~re ready to challenge the meaning of the categories of 
woman or man, nor ~ere they yet willing to look at sex/gender/desire 
as connected, s~lf-producmg, and endlessly repetitious. Further, Wittman 
does not questio~ race, c~as~, or nationalist issues within his piece. He 
chalks up the Il:oti~n of mImICry to the desire to emulate straight society, 
ra~er t?ll:n VIeWing heternormativity as working in collusion with 
nati?nalIStic and regulatory ideology of the state. In an Althusarian way 
stra~ghts are called to function as straights just as much as gays and 
les~)}~ns are compelled to mimic them. In the late 1980s and early 1990S 
aCtiVI~ts and a~demics bega~ to develop Queer Theory that sought t~ 
questio~ l~rge: SItes of regula~on and oppression by opening up discourse 
to . m';lltiphc~tive, and sometimes contradictory or contentious, ways of 
thmking, bemg, and presenting. 
.. With th: advent of Queer Theory came the unraveling of identity 
p~htics. Theonsts like Jud~th Butler,14 Eve Sedgwick,15 Lee Edelman, and 
MIc~ael War~er ha.ve questi.oned the emphasis on identity politics and the 
mynad ways m whIch Identity as a mode of rights-seeking is problematic. 
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Specifically, identity politics works within the very institutional and 
normative regulating structures which function to parse out bodies 
through the use of identity markers, such as man/woman, gay/straight or 
Black/white. Those who do not neatly fit into existing identity categories 
are pushed to the margins of society. Moreover, queer theorists look at 
how institutions and social structures tend to endlessly reproduce bodies, 
narratives and inequality while continuing to reify their own authority. For 
Queer Theory, state recognition of relationship status and marriage are 
both suspect because of the rights and privileges conferred on individuals 
by the state. With the rise in advocacy following the Baehr v. Lewin 
decision in Hawaii and Lawrence, queer activists and theorists have been 
calling for the deconstruction of same-sex relationship recognition given 
by the Lawrence decision. Because Lawrence recognizes intimate same-
sex acts that "[do] not exceed the honor of the domesticated private,"16 
same-sex marriage activists argue that the next logical step in gay and 
lesbian civil rights is same-sex marriage, while queer theorists believe 
state-sanctioned and regulated same-sex marriage would place gays and 
lesbians and under further scrutiny and surveillance. 
"OUR BROWN": LAWRENCE v TEXAS, HISTORY, CONTEXT, 
AND CRITIQUE ..• BUT NOT OF RACE 
The Lawrence v. Texas decision was handed down in June of 2003, 
and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick from 1986. This decision, making 
criminalization of sodomy unconstitutional, was championed by national 
gay and lesbian organizations as a landmark decision, one group going so 
far as to call Lawrence "our Brown."17 Yet obviously not everyone, and 
certainly not all gays and lesbians, were pleased with the decision, its 
arguments, and its possible implications as a method of regulation of 
queer bodies and relationships. Within a year, more than a handful of law 
scholars, activists, and academics challenged the good intentions of 
Lawrence and interrogated what it may mean for the future of gay rights-
and they were not alone in their uneasy and mixed feelings about the 
Lawrence decision. The same year Lawrence was handed down was also 
the year that several states had ballot initiatives to amend their respective 
constitutions to define marriage as between one man and one woman. It 
was also the same year that Massachusetts legalized same-sex marriage, 
using Lawrence as a small part of the majority's reasoning (although the 
Massachusetts court has a history of making decisions in favor of gay and 
lesbian families) . The court decisions and numerous ballot initiatives, 
happening just months apart, indicate an anxiety about gays and lesbians, 
and how recognition of their relationships fit into the national fabric. 
National gay and lesbian organizations hoped that Lawrence would be the 
gateway decision to same-sex marriage, while lawmakers and the public at 
large were thrown into a pro/con debate on marriage. While some 
lawmakers may have been supportive of gay rights, many did not want 
their constituents to believe they were attacking traditional marriage. 
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. By looking at the writings of law scholars and queer theorists, I 
examme the debate about Lawrence and the implications the decision has 
for 0e current campaign for same-sex marriage. While both queer 
theonsts and law scholars believe that Lawrence reifies a limited type of 
gay relationship, they worry about how the decision and same-sex 
marriage could further allow the state to regulate sexual relations and 
relationships, placing the homosexual body and other "deviant" bodies 
under further scrutiny. In this sense, Lawrence and gay marriage have 
been read as part of a "domesticating" project, which seeks to push the 
homosexual body into a "proper" form of existence (read monogamous, 
safe, long-term, stable) that closely resembles the straight body. IS Both the 
Lawrence decision and the push for same-sex marriage fit within a post-
9/11 politics of surveillance, regulation, and interrogation of improperly 
raced, classed, sexed, and sexualized bodies and relationships' this serves 
to discipline deviant bodies, while also unintentionally produ~ing liminal 
bodies that occupy the line between the mainstream and the deviant as the 
private and public spheres further converge. 
QUEER LEGAL DISSENTS: THE POLITICS OF PUBLICI 
PRIVATE AND SURVEILLANCE 
Writing in The Michiga"n Law Review, Nan Hunter states, "In 
Lawrence .v. T~as, 0e Supreme Court performed a double move, creating 
a dramatic discurSIve moment: it both decriminalized consensual 
homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously authorized a 
new regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality."19 For some the 
Lawrence decision meant the decriminalization of homosexual acts,' and 
therefore t~e state would b.e less involved in the prosecution of private 
sexual relations. Hunter belIeves that the Lawrence decision framed in a 
mix~d language of privatized. liberty, gives the state the right to 
continuously hear homosexualIty spoken and examined, placing the 
homosexual body and same-sex sex acts under further and more injurious 
examination and regulation. 
H~ter finds . that, because of Lawrence, "the state .. . will be more, 
not less, m~olved WIth the regulation of homosexuality."20 The paradox of 
Lawrence IS that the decision clearly indicates that the state should have 
nothing to d.o with what consenting adults do behind closed doors, yet the 
actual fun.ction of Lawrence ends up placing gays and lesbians in closer 
contact WIth the st~te and functions as a regulatory apparatus. Hunter 
equates the regulation of homosexuals with containment: how can the 
state a~ow hom?sexuality to exist while keeping it apart from, and thereby 
~ro~~cting, straIght culture? Through the regulation of relationships, the 
lImIting of culture, .and the instillation of a hierarchy within the 
homos~xual commumty, gays and lesbians will be compelled into a 
do.~esticated ~nd regulated for~ ~f sexuality with affixed state rights and 
pnvIleges, ~~Ile furth~r . ostracIzmg non-monogamous and differently 
formed famIlIes. The lImIted display and space of gay culture and the 
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hierarchy within the gay community gives gays and lesbians the incentive 
to buy into the state propagated form of same-sex marriage. Lawrence 
functions with other state institutions to domesticate queer bodies and 
relationships. 
Ironically, while Hunter argues that Lawrence puts gays and 
lesbians in closer contact with the government, she does not acknowledge 
those racialized and classed queer bodies that are already under the close 
surveillance of the state, and therefore have varying degrees of access to 
privacy.21 For raced and classed queer bodies, the divide of public and 
private spheres, which Hunter assumes to be separate, becomes a slippery 
boundary that is not only examined and further refined by state 
institutions, but also by the bodies occupying that space. Depending on 
social positioning, raced and classed queer bodies slip in and out of both 
spheres, creating a liminal raced and classed queer body. Hunter's 
containment theory sounds strikingly like Jim Crow laws of the early 
twentieth century, which were often undermined by bodies of passing. I do 
not mean to say that gays and lesbians are blatantly (and legally) separated 
from the dominant heterocentric culture, but I do mean to point out that 
her theory has a specifically racialized past. Containment, or the sectioning 
off of privileges and rights of a minority group under the guise of equality, 
is at work both in segregation laws of the past and post-9/11 politics of 
surveillance. Hunter is right to point out that Lawrence and same-sex 
marriage would put queer bodies in closer contact with regulatory 
government institutions, yet she does not account for the racialized 
implications of her theory, which not only serve to define and promote a 
domesticated and white queerness, but also to further regulate queers of 
color. 
Looking at how Lawrence functions within both the public and 
private sphere will help illustrate the racialized implications of Hunter's 
containment theory, and how liminal bodies are produced. Katherine 
Franke, writing in the Columbia Law Review, believes that "the liberty 
principle upon which the [Lawrence] opinion rests is less expansive, 
rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated. It is not the synonym 
of a robust liberal concept of freedom."22 Because the Lawrence decision 
states that the government should have nothing to do with what two 
consenting adults do behind closed doors, Lawrence puts forth a notion of 
liberty that is bound up in the domesticated private sphere. Noting that 
Lawrence articulates privacy as framed in terms of liberty, Franke looks to 
other nations and their rulings on sodomy laws to show the limited and 
privatized liberty exhibited in Lawrence. She notes that South Africans' 
arguments against sodomy laws are grounded in a politics of equal rights 
that is overtly centered in the public sphere. South African Justice 
Ackermann, Franke notes, posits a hypothetical in which several couples, 
both gay and straight, are kissing passionately in public. Ackermann notes 
that, while a straight and lesbian couple could kiss as such in public, the 
male same-sex couple would be guilty of a criminal offense. "What is 
remarkable," Franke argues, "is the degree to which [the hypothetical's] 
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absurdity does not depend on a conception of privacy .. .It is the disparate 
legal treatment of similarly situated kissers that strikes Justice Ackermann 
as absurd and unfair, not the location in which the same-sex kissing takes 
place."23 
Because the Lawrence decision is rendered in terms of a privatized 
liberty, Franke believes that "[Justice] Kennedy's privatized liberty leaves 
a wide range of homosexual and heterosexual behaviors and 'lifestyles' 
subject to criminalization."24 Franke worries that both the possibilities 
opened up and foreclosed by the Lawrence decision create a 
"domestinormative" notion of subjectivity that is relegated by the state to 
the private. Lawrence does little to find new ways of expressing sexuality 
both publicly and privately, that are counter to the heteronorm. Frank~ 
wi~hes to remind us that rights gained does not necessarily mean liberty 
gamed: "!Vhy sh~uld we take it as a priori true that the expansion of rights 
necessarily promises greater freedom? What do we risk when our political 
agenda sets a horizon that has no greater depth of field than securing legal 
rights and recognition by the state?"25 
While Franke interrogates the domesticating effects of Lawrence 
and questions the notion that "more rights equal more freedom" she does . ' 
n?t q~estion to whom the.se rights and freedoms are supposedly given. 
Situating her argument m a Post-9/n politics elucidates just how 
Lawrence functions to regulate sex and sexuality in specifically raced and 
classed terms. Because Lawrence functions within a Post-9/n politics of 
surveill?Dc~ and regulation and is framed as a privatized liberty with 
domesticati~g effects, Lawrence renders raced and classed bodies, already 
under surveillance through interactions with state institutions such as 
state medical clinics and state housing, subject to further scrutiny, and 
ther:fore forc~s them to occupy a liminal space that is neither entirely 
pubhc nor pnvate. Franke, like Hunter, points out the domesticating 
effects of Lawrence, but does not call attention to the bodies 
relationships, and sexualities-as they intersect with race and class- that 
~re .further ~arginli1:ized through the state recognition of rights within the 
hmlted pUrvIew of hberty. First, Franke does not examine the issue from 
the standpoint of those bodies/relationships, but merely calls attention to 
the effects of the law to support her claim of the "domestinormative" 
functi~ns of Lawre.nce. and. its. further extension into marriage. Further, 
she ~lsses the. racial Imph~~tlOns of a domesticated liberty that, while 
seemmgly apphcable to all citizens as worded in Lawrence is difficult for 
~aced and classed queer bodies to achieve because of their liminal position 
m between the public/private divide. Secondly, Franke returns the debate 
to the either/or frame",:o.rk of "are you for or against same-sex marriage?" 
becaus: of her he~vy cntique ~f Lawr.ence and same-sex marriage. Simply, 
she ~ehev~s that If q~eer subJ:cts WIsh to avoid state regulation of their 
rela~o~shlp. and family formations, they should question the methods of 
obtal~mg nghts and p.ri~~ges e~emplified in Lawrence. Apparently 
m~m.age and personal/mdlVldual hberty cannot coexist. And lastly, in 
pomting out how the Lawrence decision mixes liberty and privacy, Franke 
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covers over the potential radical nature of the court purposefully showing 
a connection between the public and private spheres (as it is for raced and 
classed queer bodies), rather than the spheres existing as clearly 
demarcated and discrete. 
Both Hunter and Franke focus on Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion while passingly mentioning the dissent of Justice Scalia. Bernard 
Harcourt takes up this issue and tries to fabulously reconstruct Scalia's 
dissent as "post-queer." Justice Scalia, the conservative anchor of the 
court, calls attention to several issues while writing for the minority: the 
ongoing "culture wars," the court's decision to take a side in those wars, 
the law profession that tends to function in a liberal-leaning ideology, and 
the supposed "homosexual agenda" at work in our nation. What Harcourt 
finds interesting is that, if framed differently, Justice Scalia's arguments 
against Lawrence could be read as radical, perhaps more so than Justice 
Kennedy's majority opinion. 
Scalia calls out the non-neutral position of the majority in 
Lawrence, stating that the court has taken a side in the culture wars. 
Further, Scalia is amazed that the court would not heed standare dicisis 
by overturning Bowers so quickly and with such radical language. 
Harcourt rightly argues that no decision by the Court, no matter how well 
argued, is ever clearly free of bias, and that it continues to operate within 
dominant cultural and social ideologies. Scalia is right when he says that 
the court has taken a side in the culture wars; there was simply no way 
around it. Moreover, he is right in pointing out that the seemingly liberal 
law profession functions within ideologies that led to the Lawrence 
decision, but Harcourt further points out that Scalia himself is a product of 
a larger set of interlocking institutions and cannot help but be influenced 
by ideology. Lastly, Harcourt believes that 
it is critical to dispense with the notion of a 
'homosexual agenda' and to explore, instead, the 
proliferation of sexual projects in contemporary 
society, to examine the surprising alliances that form 
on sex matters, and to reconsider all the different 
interests at stake. This may lead us, in the process, to 
revisit exactly who won and who lost in Lawrence.26 
By reworking Scalia's dissent in this fashion, Harcourt argues, we can see 
the post-queer critiques of the powers of the state and the legitimizing 
institutions behind the judicial system, as well as the social regulations 
imposed on queer bodies. 
What is left out here- as in all of the above critiques of Lawrence-
are the issues of race, class, and nationality. For these authors, it is 
assumed that, given the wording of Lawrence, all bodies that are citizens 
and are properly raced and classed have access to the liberties granted by 
the decision. To put it simply: every subject is the same before the law. Yet 
as the reading of Hunter and Franke above demonstrates, raced and 
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classed bodies occupy a liminal space, and therefore have limited access to 
the liberties that the Lawrence decision grants. Surprisingly, Harcourt 
doe~ not call attention to the post-9/ll ideologies of surveillance, of which 
ScalIa and the rest of the court are also part. By leaving issue of race and 
class untouched, Harcourt misses an opportunity to examine the true 
implications of a refashioned-and what he terms "post-queer"-reading of 
Scalia's dissent. Rather, Harcourt's wheels are spinning in the quagmire of 
queerness that is based out of a limited, one strike view of oppression and 
marginality, namely that of sexual identity. Being post-queer, through the 
deconstruction of Scalia's identity, without an in-depth analysis of race 
and class (not to mention sex and gender) is simply insufficient at 
rendering an accurate picture of the regulatory regimes at work in the 
production and decision of Lawrence v. Texas. 
WRAPPED INTO MARRIAGE AND BORDERS: FURTHER 
EXTENSIONS OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
From the standpoint of the national gay and lesbian organizations, 
once Lawrence became the law of the land and gay relationships protected 
un~er the Con~titution, the next logical step was a state-by-state or 
national campaIgn for same-sex marriage: "But the political agenda 
l:,:eraged by that recognition [of gays and lesbians as rights-bearing 
~Itizens] ~oes not exceed honor of the domesticated private. The most 
likely project .to b,~ launched from this conception of subjectivity is, of 
course, marnage. 27 Franke argues that the language of Lawrence 
relegates homosexual relations to the private sphere. Once the right-to-
priva~ ~ubjectivity is achiev~d, the next step would be to fight for public 
recognItion of same-sex relationships-gay marriage. 
. Whil~ same-sex marriage seems to be a ubiquitous issue today-
espeCIally WIth the Proposition 8 trials in California- the public at large 
rarely gets.to hear queer voices that are against same-sex marriage. Queers 
who question the value of same-sex, government-recognized marriage are 
often drowned out by the national campaigns and the media hype 
surrounding the issue. Further, because of the benefits afforded to married 
couples and the "obvious .ubiq~ity" of the issue for the gay community, it 
seems cr~ that ~nr self-Identified gay or lesbian would speak out against 
gay mamage. It IS Important to examine the arguments of anti-marriage 
queers for a few reasons: 1) their arguments provide a voice that is not 
usually hear~ o? a. na?onal s~ale, 2) their arguments further implicate 
sta~e and.soclal m~titutlOns as SItes of oppression, and 3) they also provide 
a discurSIve look mto how race and class can sometimes be forgotten in 
what has become a more "mainstream" queer movement. 
. Michael Wa~er exemplifies a queer perspective on same-sex 
marnage.28 He exammes the problems with gay marriage on two fronts: 
first, how La.wrence gets .wrapped up in the debate and, secondly, how the 
gay a?d lesbIan. commumty has been wrapped into the desire for same-sex 
marnage, despIte the costs to both gay and lesbian history and to other 
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queer bodies and relationships. Given the history of the gay and lesbian 
movement,29 he argues, it is striking that the contemporary movement is 
so willing to forget their past and ask to be regulated by an institution that 
was so heavily questioned in the 1960s, '70S, and '80S: 
Others argue, either ingenuously or disingenuously, 
that marriage has nothing to do with these historical 
commitments, that it is not a question of social change 
or cultural politics at all but a neutral matter on which 
each individual must decide. This is the official or 
semiofficial position of the major national gay and 
lesbian organizations: the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, the Human Rights Campaign, and 
Lambda Legal Defense. Either way, the crucial 
founding insights behind several decades' worth of 
gay and lesbian politics are now being forgotten. If the 
campaign for marriage requires such a massive 
repudiation of queer culture's best insights on 
intimate relations, sex, and the politics of stigma, then 
the campaign is doing more harm than marriage 
could ever be worth.30 
For Warner, the issue of marriage is not an individual question that is 
outside queer history. Rather, Warner works at length to call attention to 
queer history and its critique, focused on marriage as part of a larger 
system of regulation. The queer past's repudiation of marriage was only 
one part of a much larger critique of social systems. For queers of the past, 
questioning and challenging marriage was a way in which queers could 
fight for social change on a much larger scale. Yet the current 
configuration of marriage politics for the larger social/activist 
organizations requires, according to Warner, an erasure of the past, a 
forgetting of "queer culture's best insights on intimate relations, sex, and 
the politics of stigma."31 Erasure of the past allows for marriage advocates 
to point to ways in which marriage will "benefit" the queer community. 
Warner takes up several of the various arguments for same-sex marriage-
the domestication of "obviously promiscuous" men, recognition of love, 
the social and economic incentives of the government, and social stigma 
and shame- and deconstructs them to highlight how each still plays into a 
hierarchy of valued relationships, placing married couples higher up on 
the chain, while devaluing single people, alternate families, and long-term 
unmarried partners. 
illtimately, Warner argues that privileges that are conferred on 
married couples should be given to all citizens, regardless of marital 
status. At the same time, he questions the social value we place on 
coupling and state recognition of relationships, the shame and social 
stigma placed on gay relationships, and how culture compels gays and 
lesbians to desire marriage. Calling attention to the arbitrary link between 
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marriage and benefits, Warner writes, "Most of the benefits could be 
extended to other kinds of households and intimate relations. Very few 
have a necessary relation to a couple or intimate pair- perhaps, logically 
en?ug~, only those ~avin~ to do with divorce. All others could be thought 
of m ?ifferent ways. 32 This approach to marriage, or rather the removal of 
mar!,age ~om other economic and social benefits, fits in with the queer 
past s desIre to challenge larger social norms in order to fight for social 
change. 
While this approach would remove the economic pressures from 
couples t? marry, it does not account for the symbolic nature of marriage, 
nor ~oes It acco~mt ~or those who are aware of the marginalizing effects of 
mamage. but still WIsh to have their relationship recognized by both the 
co.~mumty and ~e state. How do these queers fit in? How, given Warner's 
cntique of marnage, could queer subjects reconcile an attachment to the 
queer movements of the past while still fulfilling their desire to marry? 
Further, what about ethnic or racial minorities? It seems that Warner 
envisions the queer community as unilaterally similar in both race and 
class, and as if neither social category were worrisome. Warner leaves 
questions like 0ese une.xamined because they do not fit within the strong 
and unapologe~c commItme~t to larger social change of queer ideology. 
. Eve.n w~ile W~rner trie~ to accommodate more queer bodies and 
relati.onshI~s mto hIS re?gunng of the debate surrounding same-sex 
marnage, his argument still comes up short, because he does not examine 
the contemporary so~ial an~ po!itical contexts within which the marriage 
debate operates. Agam, he hIghlIghts those queer bodies and relationships 
that .are ~ushed to ~he outer. margins of society by state recognition of 
relationshIps-especIally marrIage-but does not examine the debate from 
the ~tandpoint of those liminal bodies/relationships that are not 
sufficIently qu~~r, nor does he acknowledge the workings of Post-9/n 
regul~tory pohtics on raced and classed bodies. Warner's critique of 
marn~ge serves to produce yet another type of docile body, one that is 
sufficIently (;Il~eer to not desire marriage, or is not duped by the desire of 
state recognItion of any form of relationship which can be read as another 
type of, queer liminal body-the docile and insufficiently queer body. 
~a~er s call to the queer .past ends up refiguring an already wide divide 
WIthm the q';leer .co~mumty. Qu.eers who desire marriage, despite being 
aware ~f the I!ll~hcations o~ marnage, are rendered as insufficiently queer, 
occupymg a hmmal sp.ace m the queer community, and therefore subject 
to shame. ~~ments h~e Warner's call queer bodies to self-regulate into a 
st~te th~t IS COIT~ctly' queer, a subject that heeds the queer past and 
alIgns his/her deSIres to. the g.oals of that past. Warner's argument does 
anot~er double turn: whIle trying to lessen (if not end) hierarchical social 
r~l~~ons, he ends up rearticulating a rhetoric that has implications of 
diVISIon and.shame, still leaving some queers to fall through the cracks of 
personal deSIre, duty to the (queer) community, and state regulation. 
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LIMINAL BODIES: A PRODUCfIVE USE OF MODERNTIY AND 
THE FUTURISTIC POLITICS OF THE HERE-AND-NOW? 
Indeed, any viable rendering of contemporary 
biopolitics must address more specifically how 
biopower attempts not just to produce and control life 
in general ... but also to privilege some lives over 
others.33 
Looking at the queer responses to Lawrence and the push for same-
sex marriage, we can see that queer theorists and activists also frame the 
debate in either/or tenns, exchanging one fonn of scrutiny for another. 
The implication is that if subjects are not sufficiently queer, they too are 
rendered suspect, and are therefore in need of interrogation, examination, 
and-in an extreme sense-radical violence to (re)produce those subjects 
as queer. 
How can we piece together both the queer arguments while 
allowing space for those that embrace Lawrence and the national 
campaign for same-sex marriage? What other ways of examining the 
debate allow us to find new paths to bridging this gap? It is ironic that 
both sides acknowledge the limiting of bodies and relationships produced 
through Lawrence and same-sex marriage, yet neither examines the 
debate from a standpoint of raced and classed queer liminality. The 
modernist time claims of queer theorists are not useful because, given the 
current progression of the political landscape, it is not possible to reclaim 
that kind of activism without accounting for the mainstreaming of gay and 
lesbian culture. Further, the mainstream can no longer ignore queer 
critiques of governmental regulation and the interrogation of bodies and 
relations. Because both sides point to the production of bodies that exist 
outside of the either/or framing of the debates, should we not start our 
examination of the issue from these bodies/relations that toe the line 
between queer and mainstream? 
Liminal bodies are those bodies that slip in and out of spaces, but 
are not fully acknowledged in either space. Further, because liminal bodies 
actualize slippage between categories, they highlight the ability to get 
beyond the either/or framing of the debate, while showing cracks in 
institutional frameworks-cracks that are potential sites of resistance. 
Examining bodies that occupy the raced and class liminal space between 
the queer and the mainstream will further open up the debate, allowing 
scholars and activists to account for those who are forced to the margins 
by both sides in the dichotomous debate. 
For example, consider a man or woman who is married and has a 
child, but openly admits his/her attraction to the same sex and openly 
discusses his/her feelings with his/her partner. Or consider the black 
lesbian couple who is unmarried and has a child, the father of whom 
provides support and care. Or the widower who has a child, and now finds 
himself attracted to men. Or the transgendered FI'M who wants to marry 
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his partner, but cannot because doing so would disqualify him from 
receiving federal benefits such as food stamps. Or consider the lesbian 
couple and the gay couple who live together and have a child between the 
four of them. How do these relationships and their 'non-normative' family 
structures fit within both the queer and mainstream recognition and 
marriage debate? 
Currently, they do not.34 Both queer and mainstream arguments 
call attention to these liminal bodies and relationships without examining 
them. The first couple would appear 'normal' in some circles, while being 
read as queer in others-but it would really never fit neatly into either. The 
black lesbian couple could get married in some states, but how does that 
recognize the father of their child, who is deeply connected to them? The 
widower would pass in one society, and be looked at with suspicion in the 
other, while once again not really feeling at home in either. The FfM and 
his partner are left with an economic choice: food and affordable bills with 
assistance, or relationship recognition. The gay and lesbian couples could 
marry their partners, but that would not in any way acknowledge their 
status as a family. 
And these are but a few of the issues with the liminal bodies 
produced by Lawrence and same-sex marriage. An interrogation of the 
domestic implications of the regulatory, domesticating, and productive 
functions of Lawrence and the mainstream push for same-sex marriage 
needs to be conducted through the lens of raced and classed liminal 
bodies, bodies that are not unaffected by the regulatory regime of the 
nation-state, that are variously rendered unintelligible or intelligible 
depending on context, and that move in and out of spaces of normality and 
queerness. This analysis will further complicate the debate surrounding 
Lawrence and same-sex marriage, but will also provide more paths to 
questioning the effects of the state and its regulatory practices, showing 
that such practices are simultaneously oppressive and sites of resistance, 
while also removing the current debate from the either/or framing that 
serves to foreclose alternate options. 
Notes 
• For the purpose of this paper, I use "queer" to mean a paradigm that seeks to destabilize 
categories and relationships that are seemingly binary in nature. "Queer" seeks out and 
valorizes that which is odd or counter-normal, and reads between the lines to find the 
queerness in the everyday, the regulatory, and the normative. 
2 Nan H~nter, "Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny," Michigan 
Law RevIew 102 (2004): 1528-1554. 
3 Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions oj Gender in Victorian Ame/·ica 
(New York: Knopf, 1985), 93. 
4 Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Quee/· Times (Durham NC: 
Duke University Press, 2008). ' 
5 Amy L. Brandzel, "Queering Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the State," GLQ 11:2 
(2005): 171-204. 
6 Ibid, 172. 
7 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 119. 
41 
Clark 
8 Ibid, 114. 
9 See Graham Robb, Strangers: Homosexual Love in the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004); Matt Cook, ed., A Gay History oj Britain: Love and 
Sex Between Men Since the Middle Ages (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007); 
George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making oj the Gay 
Male World 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Lillian Fadennan, Odd Girls and 
1Wilight Lovers: A History oj Lesbian Life in 1Wentieth-Century America (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1991). 
'0 Michel Foucault, The History oj Sexuality, Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1978),43. 
II Katherine Franke, "The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas," Columbia Law 
Review 104 (2004): 1408. 
.2 The current rhetoric deployed by queer activists and theorists is ironic. Queer activism, 
and especia!Jy queer theory, are bound up in post-structuralism and postmodern critiques 
of institutions, systems, the production of bodies and hierarchies. Further, the activism 
and rhetoric surrounding queer theory is usua!Jy characterized not only by interrogation 
of systems, but also by the express support and claiming of contention and contestation, a 
purposely dis-unified approach to talking about systems of oppression and bodies. The 
latter of these characterizations places both the gay liberation movement and the current 
queer movement squarely in the postmodern framework that embraces alternate 
epistemologies, anarchy, and-some would say-complete chaos. The irony is that calling 
attention to the ways in which the contemporary gay and lesbian civil right movement has 
forgotten its queer past could be read as a nostalgic call for a reliving of the past. Queers 
are now put into a position of claiming a past that is no longer present, and therefore risk 
romanticizing the past. With this modernist move, questions are raised about the intent 
of claiming a time past and harkening back to an epistemological stance that seems to be 
aU but forgotten to the gay and lesbian movement at large: What do queer activists and 
theorists hope to gain by looking back in time? How does this modernist move function 
within the postmodern paradigm of the contemporary queer movement? How would this 
time claim, if actualized, function within the current political landscape? 
13 Carl Wittman, "A Gay Manifesto," in We Are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook oj 
Gay and Lesbian Politics, eds. Mark Blasius and Shane Phelan (New York: Routledge, 
1997),383· 
'4 See Judith Butler, Gender n·ouble (London: Routledge, 1990). 
'5 See Eve Sedwick, Epistemology oj the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990). 
.6 Katherine Franke, "The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas," 1413· 
'7 Ibid, 1399. See endnote 2. 
.8 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Press, 1995)· 
'9 Nan Hunter, "Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny," Michigan 
Low Review 102 (2004): 1528. 
20 Ibid, 1534. 
2 . I used the terms "raced" and "classed" throughout the paper to caJJ attention to how 
whiteness enjoys the ability to appear as a nonrace. 
22 Katherine Franke, "The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas," 1401. 
23 Ibid, 1406. 
24 Ibid, 1407. 
25 Ibid, 1419. 
26 Bernard E. Harcourt, "Foreword: 'You are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone': On 
the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers." The Journal oj Criminal 
Law & Q·iminology, 94:3(2004): 548. 
27 Franke, "The Domesticate Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas," 1413. 
2B Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics oj Queer Life 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
29 Warner's outrage at the cultural amnesia of the contemporary gay and lesbian 
movement is exemplary of the modernist move of claiming and longing for a time past. 
42 
Falling through the Cracks 
See Eric Savoy, "You Can't Go Homo Again: Queer Theory and the Foreclosure of Gay 
Studies," English Studies in Canada 20:2(1994). 
3olbid,91. 
3'lbid,91. 
32lbid, 119. 
33 Henry A. Giroux, "Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of 
Disposability." College Literature 33:3 (2006): 181. 
34 A complete reading of the ways in which queer notions of family or kinship function 
would consider the queer reading of state legitimated marriage and the delegitimation of 
kinship in Judith Butler, "Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?" Differences 13:1 
(2002): 
In the case of gay marriage or of affiliative legal alliances, we see 
how various sexual practices and relationships that fal] outside 
the purview of the sanctifying law become illegible or, worse, 
untenable, and how new hierarchies emerge within public 
discourse. These hierarchies not only enforce the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate queer lives, but they produce 
tacit distinctions among forms of illegitimacy. The stable pair 
who would marry if only they could are cast as currently 
illegitimate, but eligible for a future legitimacy, whereas the 
sexual agents who function outside the purview of the marriage 
bond and its recognized, if illegitimate, alternative form now 
constitute sexual possibilities that will never be eligible for a 
translation into legitimacy. These are possibilities that become 
increasingly disregarded within the sphere of politics as a 
consequence of the priority that the marriage debate has 
assumed. This is an i1Jegtimacy whose temporal condition is to 
be foreclosed from any possible future transformation. It is not 
only not yet legitimate, but it is, we might say, the irrecoverable 
and irreversible past of legitimacy: the never will be, the never 
was. (18) 
43 
Three Poems by Daniele Pantano 
EASTERNVILLAGE~THFACTORY 
Dogs bark in untended fields. Outside, artificial light 
Pools the road nobody's died on with men sauntering 
The graveyard shift, unafraid to sing alone. I stretch out 
And find I married a woman who doesn't care that they 
Have picked up the ambrosial bouquet of sex--neatly 
Wrapped in tissue paper--at the foot of our bed. She 
Welcomes the rabid charge. Anything that reminds her 
She belongs to the faint hinterland. She keeps the doors 
Unlocked. I say nothing. Men or dogs. There will be no 
Other end. 
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